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The U.S. livestock industry represents a critical economic infrastructure, due to 
its size and influence on national and international agricultural systems. The 
high-concentration farming practices that allow the United States to be a world 
leader in agriculture also present a vulnerability to biological pathogens, 
particularly foot and mouth disease (FMD). The purpose of this thesis is to 
stimulate and broaden the discussion of the U.S. livestock industry’s 
susceptibility to an FMD outbreak, regardless of how it is introduced. It reviews 
case studies of prominent outbreaks in the United Kingdom (2001) and Taiwan 
(1997). The themes that emerged from these case studies—responsibility and 
response—informed a discussion of ways to increase U.S. efficiency when 
responding to an FMD outbreak. The case studies illustrate that FMD outbreaks 
in thriving livestock industries can have devastating economic, social, and 
political consequences. The United States should address these and other 
international FMD outbreaks to improve the preparedness and resilience of the 
U.S. livestock industry to an outbreak of FMD. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The threat of the introduction of biological pathogens in United States 
agriculture is not only possible, but likely.1 Relevant to this threat, experts have 
testified to Congress, political scientists have written about it, and farmers worry 
about the possibility. An aspect of this threat that deserves more attention is how 
this country is overwhelmingly dependent on large-scale agricultural production, 
which is increasingly vulnerable to foot and mouth disease (FMD). In particular, 
high-concentration areas where animals are kept before being sent to slaughter, 
feeder lots located “between the barn and butcher,” and large dairy farms present 
vulnerable centers of gravity. At these locations, the entry of FMD would cause 
heavy stress to the U.S. agricultural industry. 
We should consider, in order to effectively and efficiently protect this 
vulnerable infrastructure, the potential large-scale effects of a biological pathogen 
introduced to United States. This thesis examines the potential effects of FMD on 
livestock agriculture in the United States. Specifically, this thesis asks: What are 
the consequences of introducing FMD into the high-concentration farming areas 
of the livestock industry, and what can be done to reduce the vulnerability of 
high-concentration livestock farming in the United States? 
B. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
The United States is currently responding to an outbreak of the avian flu. 
Thus far, nearly 37 million chickens have been killed and the cost to the 
                                            
1 Agroterrorism’s Perfect Storm: Where Human Animal Disease Collide: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack of the Committee on Homeland 
Security, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 2 (2006). There were many different oral 
testimonies given on this day, and all of the experts agreed that there is a threat and this issue 
needs more support at the national level. 
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economies of Minnesota and Iowa is almost $1 billion and rising.2 This thesis will 
show that experts believe that this cost could be relatively small compared to the 
effect an FMD outbreak could have on the nation’s agricultural industry. 
According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), a highly 
contagious biological agent—like foot and mouth disease—would effectively halt 
agricultural operations throughout the United States for an extended period of 
time.3 Exporting of all agricultural products would cease and those products 
would be subject to a long and tedious recertification process. It would not 
require a terrorist attack to cause such significant disruption; major FMD 
outbreaks in the United Kingdom and Taiwan were the result of the natural 
propagation of FMD and still registered significant economic and psychological 
damage to both countries. Still, the ill effects of an FMD outbreak could be much 
greater if it was purposefully introduced into animal populations with malice or 
technical sophistication. 
FMD can affect all cloven-hooved animals. FMD is naturally a very 
destructive and contagious disease that spreads easily by air and other land 
based methods of transportation. Comprised of seven types and more than 80 
subtypes, FMD is one of the agriculture industry’s most dreaded viral diseases.4 
The large amounts of variation in the virus make it difficult to produce an effective 
and universal vaccine.5 Another trait of the disease is its resilience; in optimal 
conditions, FMD can incubate as a viable virus for up to 200 days. This makes 
                                            
2 David Pitt, “Bird Flu Could Cost Nearly $1 Billion in Minnesota and Iowa,” Washington Post, 
May 18, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/bird-flu-could-cost-nearly-
1-billion-in-minnesota-and-iowa/2015/05/18/2ef0fe48-fda6-11e4-8c77-bf274685e1df_story.html. 
3 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Response Ready 
Reference Guide—Quarantine, Movement Control, and Continuity of Business (Riverdale, MD: 
USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Veterinary Services, Preparedness and 
Incident Coordination, 2013), 1, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/ 
emergency_management/downloads/fmd_rrg_cob_qmc_plan.pdf. 
4 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Foot and Mouth Disease; To Protect U.S. 
Livestock, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues (GAO-02–808) 
(Washington, DC: Author, 2002), 14. 
5 Terrence K. Kelly et al., The Office of Science and Technology Policy Blue Ribbon Panel on 
the Threat of Biological Terrorism Directed Against Livestock (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2004), 62. 
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eradication of the disease very complex.6 These naturally occurring traits do not 
require weaponization or alteration. As is, FMD presents itself as a useful tool to 
devastate the livestock industry, a key aspect of the United States economy. As 
discussed throughout this thesis, an FMD outbreak has sobering implications.  
C. IMPLICATIONS OF WORK 
Political scientists, veterinarians, and farmers have argued, especially 
after September 11, 2001, that a terrorist attack on America’s agricultural 
infrastructure—specifically against high-concentration farms—utilizing FMD 
should be a serious concern. The advancement of biotechnology has brought the 
level of knowledge required to make a serious pathogen to that of a high school 
graduate.7 Terrorists are not as familiar with bioweapons as they are with 
conventional weapons,8 but they recognize the value and vulnerability of the 
agricultural industry. Osama Bin Laden, in a 2003 sermon, said 
America is a great power possessed of tremendous military might 
and a wide-ranging economy, but all this is built on an unstable 
foundation which can be targeted, with special attention to its 
obvious weak spots. If America is hit in one hundredth of these 
weak spots, God willing, it will stumble, wither away and relinquish 
world leadership.9 
The Department of Homeland Security appropriates funding to address 
agriculture-related homeland security activities; this funding has tripled in the 
amount from $225 million, before 9/11, to $818 million in 2007.10 The increase in 
funding demonstrates recognition of an emerging threat. Still, of that allocated 
                                            
6 Kelly et al., Threat of Biological Terrorism, 62. 
7 Richard J. Danzig, A Policymaker’s Guide to Bioterrorism and What to Do About It 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security 
Policy, 2009), 9. 
8 Ibid., 12. 
9 David Ignatius, “Winning a Battle of Wills,” Washington Post, July 13, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/12/AR2005071201365.html. 
10 Jim Monke, Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness (CRS Report No. RL32521) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/ 
RL32521.pdf. 
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amount, only 6 percent is used for emergency preparedness; of that 6 percent, 
58 percent is used in border security.11 Increased border security is vital and a 
useful way to prevent attacks, but more emphasis should be placed on how to 
respond once FMD is introduced into the United States. In 2002, hundreds of 
documents were recovered from a cave in Afghanistan that expressed al 
Qaeda’s interest in attacking United States agricultural industry.12 The 
documents discussed possible attacks that would exploit the size, scope, 
productivity, and lack of preparedness in the American agricultural 
infrastructure.13 
The agriculture industry presents many vulnerabilities that groups looking 
to harm this critical infrastructure could target. In particular, high concentration 
areas of livestock are prime targets, because FMD is so contagious. For 
example, before cattle, pigs, and sheep are sent to slaughterhouses they are 
sent to feeder lots where they are fattened up to fetch a premium market price. At 
any given time, more than 70 percent of the nation’s cattle may be located within 
a 500-mile radius of 2 percent of the nation’s foodlots.14 Some of these 
“superlots” contain more than 250,000 animals; other studies suggest that 30 of 
America’s feedlots prepare 50 percent of the cattle heading to the market.15 
Billions of dollars are at risk if FMD is introduced to one or two of these critical 
nodes and is not met with a proper and planned response. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Inherent vulnerabilities in high-concentration farming are identified by 
many scholars and analysts, and authors like Richard Danzig, Jason Moats, and 
                                            
11 Monke, Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness, 37. 
12 Agroterrorism: The Threat to America’s Breadbasket: Hearing before the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, Senate, 108th Cong., 1 (2003) (statement of Susan M. Collins, Chairman 
of the Committee). 
13 Ibid., 1. 
14 Aeneas R. Gooding, “Agricultural Terrorism (Agroterror) and Escalation Theory” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 12, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3171. 
15 Ibid., 12. 
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Jim Monke provide valuable insight to the threat and magnitude of damage FMD 
can inflict on the agricultural infrastructure. Many of these experts agree that the 
greatest deficiency, in high-concentration farming, of the United States is in its 
ability to respond to this threat and build a coordinated approach to contain and 
eradicate FMD from the United States.16 
Merriam Webster defines agriculture as “the science or practice of 
farming, including cultivation of the soil for the growing of crops and rearing of 
animals to provide food, wool, and other products.17 Historically, agriculture has 
fulfilled a vital niche in the United States economy. Native Americans grew corn 
and gathered naturally growing berries to supplement a diet of wild game. Today, 
the size and production of farms is much greater. 
Since 1900, agriculture has experienced significant changes to become 
what it is today. In 1900, agriculture employed 41 percent of the work force.18 In 
1920, farmers comprised 27 percent of the labor force, operated over six million 
farms with an average size of 148 acres, and produced up to five commodities on 
each farm.19 From 1920 to 1929 U.S. exports were $1.94 billion per year.20 In 
2012, farmers operated just over two million farms in the United States, tilled 
acreage averaging over 430 acres per farm, and produced, on average, one 
                                            
16 Danzig, Policymaker’s Guide to Bioterrorism, 2; Monke, Agroterrorism: Threats and 
Preparedness, ii; Peter Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of 
Deliberate Biological Attacks against the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2004), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/ 
RAND_MG135.pdf. 
17 Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 5th ed., s.v., “Agriculture” (Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014). 
18 Carolyn Dimitri, Anne Effland, and Neilson Conklin, The 20th Century Transformation of 
U.S. Agriculture and Farm Policy (Economic Information Bulletin Number 3) (Washington, DC: 
Economic Research Service, USDA, 2005). http://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
media/259572/eib3_1_.pdf. 
19 “Growing a Nation: The Story of American Agriculture,” National Agriculture in the 
Classroom, last modified 2014, http://www.agclassroom.org/gan/index.htm. 
20 National Agriculture in the Classroom, “Growing a Nation.” 
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commodity.21 In 2012, agriculture and agriculture related industries contributed 
$775.8 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP); of that figure American 
farmers contributed $166.9 billion or 1 percent of GDP.22 In 2014, agricultural 
exports exceeded $152 billion and imports totaled over $109 billion.23 The 
transformation that has taken place over the past century is a forced response to 
the increase in population, and specialization has allowed farmers to shift from 
small multiple commodity farms to large-scale single commodity operations. 
Another point of interest is that a state, like Texas, can have as many 
animals as the country of South Korea.24 Thirty-five of 50 states have susceptible 
livestock in excess of 1 million animals; 10 states have over 5 million; and 
4 states have more than 10 million animals.25 These high-concentration farms 
create a greater interconnectedness, because farmers now rely on others to 
supplement needed inputs such as feed, bedding, and waste processing. 
1. Operation of American Agriculture 
Agriculture in the United States is diverse and permeates many different 
industries and locations. Wisconsin is known as America’s dairy land because of 
large dairy farms that produce milk for the production of cheese and other dairy 
products; Iowa is known for large pig farms; Texas has large ranches with many 
head of cattle to support a huge beef industry.26 
                                            
21 “Ag and Food Sectors and the Economy,” USDA, Economic Research Service (ERS), last 
modified April 6, 2015, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-the-
essentials/ag-and-food-sectors-and-the-economy.aspx. 
22 USDA, ERS, “Ag and Food Sectors.” 
23 “Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, FATUS,” spreadsheet, United States 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, last modified April 6, 2015, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/Foreign_Agricultural_Trade_of_the_United_States_FATUS/Lat
est_U.S._Agricultural_Trade/monsumtable.xls. 
24 USDA, Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Response Ready Reference Guide—Overview of 
FMD Vaccine Issues (Riverdale, MD: USDA APHIS, Veterinary Services, PIC, 2013), 2, 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/fmd_plan_rrg_vac
cine.pdf. 
25 USDA, Overview of FMD Vaccine Issues, 2. 
26 Jason B. Moats, Agroterrorism: A Guide for First Responders (College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2007), 6. 
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There are many layers to the agricultural system in the United States. 
Whether a farm is in Wisconsin or California, the foundation of each starts with 
the organism that is produced on each. The operation that grows or raises the 
organism is a farm. The farm can be a small family farm that keeps fewer than 
one hundred milking cows or a huge corporation that keeps over five thousand 
milking cows.27 The USDA defines a farm as any place from which $1,000 or 
more of agricultural products were produced and sold, or normally would have 
been sold, in a year.28 
A group of farms in a geographical area make up an agricultural 
community. The ability to specialize in one aspect of farming allows for higher 
levels of production, because farmers can put all their time and energy into a 
specific commodity. For example, a grain farmer will sell soybeans to the feed-
mill which will subsequently sell feed to farmers that are raising livestock, 
alleviating the need for a livestock farmer to grow grains. This sharing provides a 
network between farms to support each other so they can specialize, but not 
have the burden of being self-sufficient.29 
The next layer of agriculture is the national agriculture system. This layer 
consists of agricultural communities and all of the supporting features that make 
farming possible. Some of the supporting industries are petrochemical 
manufacturing, which creates fertilizers and insecticides, and heavy machinery 
manufacturing, which builds implements for tilling and harvesting crops. This 
level also includes the interaction with wholesalers, retailers, and the federal 
government, which is a large buyer and seller of agricultural products. 
The final layer of the U.S. agricultural industry is the international market. 
As discussed earlier, the United States exports billions of dollars in agricultural 
products, so the ability of the United States to continue meeting the needs of 
                                            
27 Moats, Agroterrorism: A Guide for First Responders, 6. 
28 “Glossary of Terms,” USDA, ERS, last modified May 22, 2015, http://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
topics/farm-economy/farm-household-well-being/glossary.aspx#farm. 
29 Moats, Agroterrorism: A Guide for First Responders, 6. 
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other countries is important to the overall health of U.S. agriculture. All of this 
interconnectedness provides the smooth sharing and growing of a vital industry, 
but interconnectedness also presents a vulnerable system that could be 
devastated by a disruption to operations.30 
2. Fragility of Livestock Industry 
Jason Moats argues that the international agriculture industry will likely not 
fail if one farm stops producing milk or one farm stops growing corn; however, if a 
disease or natural disaster destroyed or debilitated a few farming communities, 
there is a very good chance that the interconnectedness of agriculture would 
result in massive losses across all levels.31 FMD exploits the mobility and 
closeness of the livestock industry. If a cow, pig, sheep, or goat is infected with 
FMD, and the disease has not been identified by the farmer or veterinarian, the 
potential for that animal to travel thousands of miles and infect other animals it 
comes in contact with is very great. The mobility and interconnectedness of 
concentration farming in the United States, and the world, only increases the 
chances of a biological agent to enter the United States and deliver a crippling 
blow to the agricultural industry as it is known today. An extremely contagious 
disease, like FMD, is just the type of biological agent that once introduced to the 
United States, whether accidentally or maliciously, would require a rehearsed, 
efficient, and robust response to minimize damages.32 
3. Why the American Livestock Industry Is at Risk 
As previously discussed, the United States increasingly relies on 
agriculture to support the growing population and exportation of goods. Farms 
have also increased in size, resulting in higher vulnerability to biological agents 
from either natural causes or terrorist attacks. Farmers tend to specialize in one 
                                            
30 Moats, Agroterrorism: A Guide for First Responders, 7–8. 
31 Ibid., 8. 
32 Ibid., 8–9. 
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area of farming. According to experts, specialization creates huge monocultures 
of animals and creates greater vulnerabilities to pathogens. 
Farmers are overconfident in this monoculture and rely on the stability and 
health of herds to not use vaccines against potential pathogens; moreover, 
statutes against vaccinating herds, due to the contagious nature of FMD, 
increase susceptibility to an outbreak.33 According to a RAND study, if FMD was 
introduced to a cow at an auction, within 24–48 hours that animal could possibly 
travel up to 1000 miles and infect every cloven-hoofed animal with which it 
comes in contact—or even those animals it does not contact, because FMD can 
be transmitted through the air.34 
4. Entry into the United States  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified many ways for 
FMD to enter in the United States. Every year approximately 470 million 
international passengers and pedestrians transit through U.S. ports of entry, and 
of those the USDA only has the capacity to inspect about 102 million.35 Aside 
from terrorist plots and attempts to disperse pathogens, daily there are 
international flights that contain food waste, international mail that enters the U.S. 
every day and must be screened, and U.S. military personnel returning form 
tours overseas.36 
Every one of these situations presents a potential entrance for FMD to 
enter the United States, and the inability of the USDA to properly inspect every 
item is an understandable situation. However, the inability to inspect every 
person, bag, trash can, and boot that enters the United States poses a 
vulnerability for biological agents to enter the country.37 
                                            
33 Henry S. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat 
(Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002), 12. 
34 Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly, 8. 
35 GAO, Foot and Mouth Disease, 44. 
36 Ibid., 44. 
37 Ibid., 38. 
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5. Impact 
An FMD outbreak in the United States would wreak devastating economic 
damage. The GAO recognizes the direct cost of hoof and mouth disease 
eradication to include the following measures: quarantines, intense inspections of 
meat products entering and exiting the United States, sanitation of facilities, 
disposal and burying of diseased and culled animals, vaccine creation and 
dissemination, and producer compensations.38 In the United Kingdom’s outbreak 
of 2001 direct costs of eradication cost over $6 billion.39 If there was an outbreak 
in the United States and the disease was identified early, confined, and efficiently 
eradicated, the cost could easily be that much.40 
The GAO and RAND researcher Henry Parker agree that the effects of 
FMD would decimate the job market. Agriculture may only directly employ 
3 percent of the U.S. population, but 1 in 8 people are employed in the support of 
food production and dissemination.41 The cascading effect would go something 
like this: cattle producers detect the pathogen on their farm, that farm and every 
farm the animal was in contact with previously are immediately quarantined—not 
to mention every farmer in a 50-mile radius will be on high alert, all imports and 
exports of animal products are stopped, feed producers cannot sell their 
products, stores pull meat from shelves, consumers become afraid to eat meat, 
and the effects go on and on.42 The point of the illustration is to show the 2nd-, 
3rd-, and 4th-order effects that are possible and often not factored into the 
calculus when determining a policy to prevent FMD from entering the United 
States. 
A study published in the Journal of Psychiatric Practice identifies how 
traumatized farmers, workers, and a population can become when they witness 
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the mass slaughtering and burning of hundreds of thousands of animals. 
Farmers are especially vulnerable to this from the human-animal relationship 
developed in rearing the livestock.43 Farmers that witnessed the United Kingdom 
(U.K.) outbreak often described the traumatic experience as follows, “We could 
hear the lambs bleating even after leaving the yards, and we were no longer able 
to watch.”44 The article also found that farmers were afflicted with feelings of 
guilt, shame, helplessness, anger, and grief over losing the farm. 
6. Farmer Protections 
The Farm Bill of 2014 signed by President Obama builds on the principles 
of investing, expanding, conserving, and increasing knowledge in agriculture 
from the 2008 version.45 In 2011, disaster assistance programs expired leaving 
farmers impacted by disease or adverse weather situations without aid, but the 
Farm Bill of 2014 restored the livestock disaster assistance program and allows 
farmers to make claims from the expiration of assistance in 2011.46 In addition to 
making retroactive payments, the 2014 bill established a permanent safety net 
for farmers affected by disease or adverse weather situations.47 Establishing 
these protections is advantageous for farmers, but the bill does not place any 
focus on prevention. The bill is focused on programs to subsidize farmer’s losses 
by disease and weather.  
In trade and foreign agriculture there is a continuing allotment of $200 
million annually for international market development and increased flexibility for 
assistance in emergency situations.48 However, the bill vaguely addresses the 
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need to develop programs that prevent the entrance of disease into the United 
States or the identification and response to a biological outbreak in U.S. territory. 
These continuations and increases still fail to place a precedence on the 
importance of prevention, response, and level of complexity a biological outbreak 
would place on the United States and International agricultural industry. The 
Farm Bill of 2014 may not focus on prevention, but there are organizations that 
are working to prevent the entrance of FMD into the United States and minimize 
the impact of FMD if it does reach the United States. 
Organizations like the World Organization for Animal Health (OiE), the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and the USDA continually strive to develop 
tracking mechanisms, early detection technology, standardized responses, and 
effective vaccines for contagious biological pathogens.49 The World Trade 
Organization uses the OIE, and its 180 member countries, as reference 
organizations to monitor animal health worldwide in order to preserve 
international trade volume through intergovernmental relationships.50 In order to 
minimize the chances of FMD spreading to countries that are designated as 
“FMD free,” the World Animal Health Organization has statutory reporting 
requirements by its member countries.51 Since the United States is a member of 
the World Animal Health Organization it is subject to guidelines delineated by the 
OIE.52 
In recent years, USDA scientists have continually developed more 
sophisticated vaccines that significantly reduce the time to develop antigens 
preventing the contraction of FMD. In 2014, the agricultural research service, a 
part of the USDA that studies FMD, developed a new vaccine that can make pigs 
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resistant to FMD within 24 hours. Prior to this breakthrough there was a 4–7 day 
wait before swine were protected.53 These continued advances in vaccinations 
are the key to minimizing the effects of an FMD outbreak in the United States. 
This literature review presents the transformation and current situation of 
U.S. agriculture by scientists and academics. They reinforce that the livestock 
industry is vitally important to the United States and increases in size and 
production have created vulnerabilities that could devastate this infrastructure if 
exploited accidentally or maliciously. However, there is solace in the advances 
organizations like the USDA’s Agricultural Research Center and World Animal 
Health Organization are making to better understand and control this contagious 
biological pathogen. The results of underestimating the probability and scope of a 
biological outbreak in the United States could lead to the culling of millions of 
animals and billions of dollars in response-related expenses.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis compares two case studies where FMD devastated thriving 
agricultural industries in the U.K. (2001) and Taiwan (1997). Each case study’s 
analysis focuses on four categories: origin and propagation, response, 
implications of disposal and clean-up, and economic impact.  
Standardizing these case studies allowed the author to note the 
similarities and shortcomings in each case. The lessons learned from the case 
studies provide the United States with valuable tools to decrease the vulnerability 
of U.S. agriculture to FMD. Ideally, this thesis will continue the discussion and 
make suggestions to increase the resilience of the livestock industry through 
training and policy recommendations.  
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into four chapters. Chapter I offers the reader an 
overview of agriculture in the United States and the vulnerabilities that exist in 
this large interconnected infrastructure. Chapter II examines two recent instances 
of FMD: the United Kingdom (2001) and Taiwan (1997). Each case will begin by 
examining the origin and propagation of the outbreak, followed by an analysis of 
the government’s response, the disposal and clean-up operation, and the overall 
economic impact of the outbreak. The chapter concludes with a review of the 
lessons learned from these two outbreaks. Chapter III applies what was learned 
from the U.K. and Taiwan to navigate U.S. risk in an FMD outbreak, and 
determine the factors that can minimize the effects of FMD. The fourth and final 
chapter explores a terrorism-motivated exposure of FMD and an analysis of the 
current readiness level of the United States. 
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II. CASE STUDIES OF FMD IN THE U.K. AND TAIWAN  
While there are many dangerous diseases that could be introduced into 
the United States, the World Organization for Animal Health established foot and 
mouth disease as a first priority on its official list of free countries and zones.54 
The United States has been foot and mouth disease free since 1929, but that 
does not mean the country’s agriculture infrastructure is secure from the threat of 
this dangerous biological pathogen entering the U.S. again.55 The introduction of 
a biological pathogen, like FMD, can truly decimate a thriving agricultural 
industry, especially when the interconnectedness and mobility of the 
infrastructure allow for thousands of animals to be moved thousands of miles in a 
couple of days. The experiences of the United Kingdom and Taiwan56 in 2001 
and 1997 paint a vivid picture of the dangerous characteristics of FMD. The 
consequences of poor preparation and execution are represented in the case 
studies that will be examined in this chapter. Specifically, this chapter asks if 
there are areas these two countries could have better prepared and responded to 
minimize the prodigious impact FMD had on their economies. 
A. UNITED KINGDOM OUTBREAK 
The first case study this chapter will examine is that of the United 
Kingdom, where more than 3 million sheep, 590,000 cattle, 140,000 pigs, 2,000 
goats, and 1,000 deer were killed in 2001 to stop the proliferation of FMD.57 Over 
12,000 farmers and farm workers lost their jobs and the outbreak cost the 
                                            
54 “About FMD,” World Organization for Animal Health, last modified 2015, 
http://www.oie.int/en/animal -health-in-the-world/fmd-portal/about-fmd/. 
55 USDA, Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Response Ready Reference Guide— (Riverdale, 
MD: USDA APHIS, Veterinary Services, PIC, 2015), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/ 
emergency_management/downloads/fmd_rrg_freedom_and_vaccination.pdf. 
56 Taiwan is also known as China (Taipei) depending on who you ask, but for the purposes 
of this thesis it will be referred to as Taiwan. 
57 Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism, 14–15. 
 16
government approximately $6 billion.58 The contagious nature of FMD and a 
month of its undetected spread allowed FMD to permeate many layers of the 
agricultural industry in the U.K. 
Just as in a car crash, getting professional medical attention to the injured 
is critical and often the biggest factor in minimizing the spread of damage; 
responding to FMD is the same—early detection and corrective measures are 
paramount in containing and eradicating the disease. Symptoms in animals, 
sufficient for an FMD diagnosis, could have been identified as early as January 
20, 2001, but no phone call was made until February 19, when the resident vet at 
the abattoir called state veterinarians to confirm what he thought was either FMD 
or swine vesicular disease.59 
1. Origin and Propagation 
On February 20, 2001, the U.K. reported its first case of FMD in Essex 
from an abattoir,60 but the index case (the first case of the disease) is thought to 
have come from Burnside Farm, a pig finishing lot61 in Northumberland, which 
feeds pigs processed food waste, known as pigswill.62 Unfortunately, this pigswill 
was most likely contaminated with FMD from illegally imported meat. Moreover, 
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as the meat entered the country illegally there was no way to trace its origin, but 
the same strain of FMD is prominent in the Far East.63 
Although only 1.4 percent of the pig population was fed using swill, on 
May 24, 2001, the government implemented a ban on this feeding practice due to 
the high probability of illegally imported meat infected with FMD being used.64 
Some of the pigs at Burnside farm had lesions that were 12 days old, indicating 
the possibility of FMD being present as early as January of 2001, which allowed 
for almost a month of unhindered spread.65 Since FMD was allowed to propagate 
undetected for over a month it allowed pigs to be transferred to farms over 
300 miles away. 
Pigs are large, and thus they produce large amounts of aerosolized FMD. 
Their movement throughout the country exposed very susceptible yet 
asymptomatic sheep66 almost two miles away. As a result, sheep became 
infected by inhaling the pathogen as it traveled through the air.67 Delays in 
reporting allowed Burnside Farm to move infected animals to other farms and 
abattoirs, increasing the range of the virus and delaying critical response times.  
One can imagine that farmers heard about the looming ban on 
transporting animals and decided to move every animal they could (Figure 1). 
This last-minute movement of animals would ensure the farmers had the 
opportunity to collect profits before the transportation ban took place. It was 
estimated that 25,000 sheep, all exposed to FMD, were transported throughout 
the country from February 14 to February 23.68 
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Figure 1.  Map of Animal Movements before February 23, 200169 
2. Response 
There was an immediate quarantine placed on the abattoir to properly 
assess the animals on site, to determine the origin of the infected pigs, and blood 
samples were sent to the state laboratory to be tested.70 However, poor 
communication resulted in the samples sitting until the following day. Only then 
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was the identification of FMD confirmed and relayed to the Ministry of Agriculture 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF).71 
Even with a positive FMD sample, the MAFF not only required a second 
sample, it required that Dr. Alex Donaldson, Head of Pirbright Laboratory, 
observe first-hand the symptoms displayed by the pigs at the abattoir.72 One can 
appreciate the credence placed on a positive diagnosis due to the economic 
ramifications of FMD, but these actions eliminated precious response time. His 
identification of FMD was needed to allow the culling of infected animals to begin. 
Now, not many people, especially farmers, want to cull animals that are 
perceived to be healthy and saleable, but a situation involving extremely 
contagious pathogens has much greater costs to the farmer and industry when 
animals are allowed to remain a viable medium capable of spreading the virus 
further. Exports were promptly stopped on the February 20, 2001, but animal 
movements inside the country were authorized until February 23. The decision to 
allow animal transports, already in progress, to be completed resulted in a record 
number of animals being moved around the country, greatly increasing the 
potential spread of FMD.73 
a. Personnel 
The personnel issues are manning and training. Each farm potentially 
exposed to FMD needed a team consisting of one veterinarian and at least two 
helpers, and once the team finished on one farm it was considered dirty and 
unable to move to the next area until a certain period of time had passed.74 The 
personnel resources and tasking, especially in veterinarians, was often 
concentrated on non-vet tasks because people were not properly trained, 
resulting in wasted time and resources. The number of veterinarians who 
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responded was insufficient to bring about the eradication of the disease; on April 
1, 2001, more than 600,000 animals awaited slaughter and approximately 
1,200 veterinarians oversaw these operations.75 
Adequate levels of veterinarian support were not attained until the 
government called all veterinarians, military and civilian, to assist in the efforts.76 
The critics of waiting to involve the military in support of the response think the 
delay was to avoid promulgating a negative political message during an election 
year.77 
b. Vaccinations 
In an outbreak of FMD, vaccinations can be the most hotly debated topic 
because of policy and scientific issues.78 There are three methods of vaccinating 
animals: 
1. Routine, mass vaccination for long-term prevention when FMD is 
endemic or recurrent-outlawed in the EU because vaccine is a live 
virus; 
2. Protective vaccine, emergency vaccination of a limited number of 
animals in a restricted area—vaccinate-to-live; 
3. Suppressive vaccination, emergency vaccination and subsequent 
slaughter of a limited number of animals in a restricted area—
vaccinate-to-die.79 
Each of the three methods has implications for the international trading 
market. International trade restrictions are enforced to isolate the outbreak 
country and prevent more infected animals from entering or exiting the country. 
For example, an animal vaccinated to live will finish out its economic life, but will 
prevent the clearing of trade restrictions. This method raises pressure to 
eliminate those animals so international trade will resume earlier, instead of 
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waiting up to 12 months to gain a cleared status.80 There are many moral 
discussions with respect to slaughtering millions of healthy, vaccinated animals—
particularly if the mass killing serves only to reduce the time a country is 
restricted from international trade.81 The requirements to be designated an FMD-
free country and to resume international trade are provided in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  International Animal Health Code in 200182 
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Vaccination in the U.K. was not seen as a viable option because the virus 
had already spread throughout the country, and restrictions on exports were 
already implemented.83 The looming economic losses dictated a plan that 
expedited the reinstatement of international trade. The effectiveness of 
vaccinations is dependent on the timely discovery and implementation of 
responses—which, as seen above, was not the case. 
3. Implications of Disposal and Clean-up 
In order to fully eradicate FMD from 8,450 farms, over 3 million animals 
were culled, often requiring the slaying of 80,000 animals per day.84 The U.K. 
fielded many issues in response to the mass eradication of animals, including 
opposition from farmers, the public, and law-makers. The government was 
accused of preemptively killing animals on farms that may not have become 
infected, a practice called “contiguous killing.” One of the biggest lessons learned 
from an outbreak of classical swine fever in the Netherlands in 1997,85 however, 
was that the suspension of contiguous culling at all possible establishments was 
the reason for the massive spread of infection.86 A problem with contiguous 
killing was the large area it covered; disposing of large numbers of seemingly 
healthy animals; and the serious personnel, environmental, and psychological 
problems that accompany this type of tactic.87 
British authorities could have drawn important lessons regarding the 
disposal of animal carcasses from the disposal of pigs in the Netherlands during 
the 1997 classical swine fever outbreak.88 The U.K. disposal tactics experienced 
the same logistical hurdles; even though mass burial sites are the easiest and 
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quickest method of disposing carcasses, there are possibilities of negative 
environmental consequences. The effects include large burial sites leaving large 
areas of land unusable for many years, and the possibility of contaminating local 
drinking water if toxins leach through the ground.89 The landfill owners were 
reluctant to accept the carcasses because of community implications, which 
resulted in the digging of mass disposal sites elsewhere. 
The use of incineration is also quick and easy, but the large number of 
carcasses, in this case, could result in large plumes of smoke polluting the air 
and the negative psychological effects of seeing thousands of burning carcasses 
weighs heavily on some.90 Moreover, the media took many photos when large 
piles of pig carcasses were burned in 1997 and the effect on the tourism industry 
lingered for many years.91 However, the longer the infected carcasses remain 
above ground or intact, the higher the probability of spreading FMD.92 This was 
particularly apparent in Cumbria, as 40,000 carcasses lay rotting for weeks prior 
to disposal.93 Killing and disposing of affected animals was not possible until the 
military was called upon to bring large machinery and manpower to assist in 
controlling measures.94 The military was able to use its specialty in logistics and 
management to effectively and efficiently dispatch resources to bring the 
outbreak under control.95 
4. Economic Impact 
The economic impact of the FMD outbreak in the U.K. was equivalent to 
over $6 billion and affected not only the agricultural industry but the tourism 
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industry as well.96 The financial cost of FMD was not taken on by farmers, many 
of whom received welfare payments from the government and other private 
business, but there were others employed in agriculture and in the tourism 
industry who were not subsidized, forcing them to close businesses and seek 
other employment.97 After a 1967 FMD outbreak, a comprehensive cost-benefit 
analysis was conducted and found that the economic benefits of implementing 
control measures exceeded the cost of controls and eradication of FMD.98 
B. TAIWAN OUTBREAK 
Taiwan enjoyed more than 68 years without an FMD outbreak, but on 
March 14, 1997, a pig farm called in a suspected case of FMD. Upon 
confirmation of FMD, Taiwan closed its export market, suffering large economic 
losses. In addition to losses in exports, over 65,000 jobs in feed mills, 
pharmaceuticals, meat packing, machinery manufacturing, and transportation 
were lost. These huge losses can be reduced through mitigating and controlling 
measures taken in pre- and post-pandemic situations. The factors that hindered 
the response in the U.K. were also found in Taiwan’s response, and reinforce the 
requirement to be ready and capable of an effective reaction when faced with this 
type of situation. The size and speed of the 1997 Taiwan FMD outbreak is 
attributed to the following factors: inability to shutdown livestock auction markets, 
delays in depopulation methods, pig density was very high (1922 pigs/km2), and 
a shortage of vaccines.99 
1. Origin and Propagation 
The case of FMD in the U.K. took just over 24 hours to confirm with 
deficiencies that could have provided an earlier diagnosis and response. 
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Taiwan’s FMD outbreak took five days to confirm, and in that time, FMD spread 
to 28 pig farms. On March 19, 1997, after FMD was confirmed in Taiwan, the 
policy to cull all pigs on infected farms and vaccinate all farms in the surveillance 
zone (SZ) was enacted immediately.100 In Taiwan’s FMD outbreak, the infected 
and surrounding areas were classified in two zones. Taiwan designated the area 
where FMD was first discovered as the protection zone, and it extended three 
kilometers in all directions from infected farms. 
The surveillance zone extends another three kilometers and ideally 
provides enough of a buffer to stop the spread of FMD by airborne methods. 
However, this tactic did not curb the spread of FMD,101 because pigs infected 
with FMD can produce up to 108 Tissue Culture Infective Doses (TCID50) when 
only 10 TCID50 is needed to infect other animals with the virus.102 These large 
amounts of airborne FMD allowed easy transmission between the densely 
populated farming communities of Taiwan.103 As of April 15, 1997, there were 
over 3,700 farms infected with FMD and there was no sign of decelerating the 
pandemic. The failure to stop transportation of pigs was a major contributor to the 
spread of FMD, because the livestock market was a nexus of the pandemic.104 
The strain of FMD introduced to Taiwan did not affect ruminant animals 
even when they came in direct contact with pigs infected by FMD. This may have 
reduced the number of animals to cull, but the high density of pig farms in Taiwan 
resulted in the exposure of 78.1 percent of the entire pig population to FMD.105 
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2. Response 
During the outbreak in Taiwan there were over 4 million pigs killed to stop 
the spread of FMD, and an important problem of FMD response is finding a way 
to dispose of this many carcasses. The military brought heavy machinery, 
personnel, and experience in logistics and management that aided the 
responders and was able to clear the backlog of animals needing to be culled or 
disposed.106 
The benefits of the military responding included large machinery that was 
used to help dig large holes to bury carcasses. They also supplemented non-
skilled positions that allowed veterinarians to concentrate of treating sick animals. 
Lastly, the military was able to use its experience in moving large amounts of 
supplies and managing large operations in restricted environments. 
a. Personnel 
Like the U.K. outbreak, response personnel were unable to contain and 
keep up with the rapid spread of FMD. The number of farms and animals infected 
with FMD significantly increased the need for skilled and unskilled manpower and 
was supplemented by military personnel. Taiwan, like the U.K., was very short on 
personnel and responders, which led to infected farms being placed on a waiting 
list of one to four weeks before eradication was able to be carried out.107 It was 
not until the military intervened that the backlog of actions was cleared and some 
level of control was attained. 
b. Vaccines 
Vaccinations are a key element of eradicating FMD from a country. 
However, the shortages in vaccinations left partially vaccinated farms vulnerable 
to FMD infection and merely served as a node to advance the spread of FMD. In 
late April, attempting to control the outbreak, Taiwan decided to vaccinate all 
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animals. The blanket vaccination led to vaccine shortages, so triage dictated that 
farms in the surveillance zone received vaccines first. The inability to vaccinate 
was reversed when a shipments of vaccines started to arrive in late April and 
early May.108 As the supply replenished, priority would go to animals in the 
protection zone.109 
When Taiwan was able to enforce transportation restrictions, in 
conjunction with newly adopted vaccination practices, the disease started to 
show a decrease in new cases and relieved the requirement to kill all animals on 
infected premises to only eradicating clinically ill animals. The successful 
vaccination of all animals significantly slowed the spread of FMD, and on July 15, 
1997, the last new case of FMD was reported in Taichung County.110 In total 
there were 6,147 farms infected with FMD and over 4 million pigs were 
destroyed.111 
The vaccines did allow for country-wide vaccinations, but a perpetual 
reliance on them prevents an OIE classification of FMD free without vaccination. 
An OIE classification of FMD-free with vaccination significantly reduces the 
number of countries on can trade with. Taiwan is still battling FMD outbreaks and 
suffers great economic losses from what was once a primary exporter of pork in 
the region. The waiting periods for vaccinate-to-live practices require twice the 
wait time to regain export privileges and can incur huge monetary costs.112 
Unfortunately, sporadic outbreaks of FMD have prevented Taiwan from achieving 
a FMD-free status without vaccination.  
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3. Implication of Disposal and Clean-up 
There were over 4 million pigs culled to stop the spread of FMD in Taiwan, 
and there was a backlog, ranging from one to four weeks, of farms that needed 
help slaughtering and disposing of dead animals. Animals with acute symptoms 
of FMD made up 4.5 percent of animals killed. The remaining 95.5 percent—or 
3.85 million heathy pigs—were casualties of eradication strategies. There are 
controversial discussions in regard to killing millions of healthy animals to gain an 
FMD free without vaccination status using a stamping out method. A stamping 
out method merely uses vaccines to stop the spread of FMD and once the 
spread is stopped every healthy animals that received a vaccination is killed.113 
This argument is outside the scope of this thesis, but it will be recommended in 
the future work section to, ideally, create more discussion on a controversial 
topic. 
4. Economic Impact 
The 1997 outbreak of FMD in Taiwan resulted in a price tag of over 
$6 billion dollars.114 Most of the losses stem from the restrictions on international 
trade, because Taiwan, once a net exporter of pork and pork products, now relies 
on imports.115 The outbreak lowered the price of pork across the board, so even 
farms that were not exposed to FMD suffered a 70-percent decrease in market 
prices.116 In order to offset the price drop in pork, the government agreed on 
indemnity payments to farmers affected by FMD. However, since the indemnity 
payments were higher than market value, some farmer purposefully infected their 
otherwise clean farms. 
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Taiwan’s government bore the majority of indemnity payments, but many 
businesses and industries were unable to continue operating. The total number 
of jobs lost from the Taiwan outbreak is estimated to be over 65,000.117 
Additionally, some estimates value the total economic impact at $19 billion in lost 
revenue.118 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
In both of the case studies presented, experts were able to determine the 
origin of animal-zero (the index case). Interestingly, according to some reports, 
the 1997 Taiwan case may have originated with a pig placed deliberately by 
China; although this claim is unproven, it represents the difficulty in preventing 
and laying blame on a possible attack aimed at disrupting a country’s critical 
agricultural infrastructure.119 In both cases, the terrible destruction and financial 
burden placed on the country involved highlight the importance of developing a 
response, mitigating risk, and maintaining communication between players 
involved and the public. Regardless of how FMD enters the United States, one 
can appreciate the destructive power of this disease, and place credence on 
learning from other countries affected by this devastating disease. If this is the 
case, the United States would be remiss not to learn from the mistakes of other 
countries and take appropriate measures to ensure the chances of an FMD 
happening are at or approaching zero. 
1. United Kingdom 
J. M. Scudamore, the Chief Veterinary Officer in the U.K., attributed the 
size and extent of the outbreak to seven key factors:  
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1. Delay in reporting the index case120 
2. Airborne infection of nearby sheep farm 
3. Movement of infected sheep before index case was reported 
4. Optimal climate increased virus survival during a time when large 
numbers of sheep were being transported about the country 
5. FMD in sheep rarely includes lesions, making diagnosis harder 
6. Large herd size and reductions in labor fostered shared and 
contracted labor 
7. Sheep herding practices bring sheep together often allowing for 
easier spread of the disease through prolonged contact and shared 
labor121 
The United Kingdom had plans drawn up to respond to a biological 
disaster, but they never practiced or disseminated emergency actions to farmers 
and local law enforcement. Another problem was that the threat of an outbreak 
was never seen as a serious danger. Low-level farmers and state workers felt the 
state was not adequately prepared to respond to a disease outbreak; however, 
these concerns were never discussed at a decision-makers’ level.122 The inability 
to relay concerns to leaders, the under-practiced emergency actions, and the 
passive approach of the government to a viable threat resulted in the late 
detection, underestimation, and ultimate devastation to a portion of the U.K.’s 
agricultural system.123 
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The U.K. case points up many recommendations to reduce or prevent a 
recurrence of this magnitude. The recommendations start by increasing pressure 
on the root cause of the outbreak—illegally imported meat. In order to 
accomplish this, there was increased power given to enforcement officers when 
searching baggage and governmental powers implemented strict rules on 
imports from third-world countries while reforming personal import regulations.124 
The poor levels of communication during the outbreak served as an exacerbating 
factor and were not only present between farmers and response authorities but 
between the population and government as well. 
The government is increasing its support to advance the education and 
training of vets, farmers, and civilians alike with the goal of increasing the 
importance of effectively communicating during an emergency—where timely 
diagnostics are imperative on setting response measures in action.125 There are 
still problematic issues with vaccinations and culling tactics, and they need to be 
addressed at the highest levels of government.126 However, the U.K. provides 
great insight to the potential problems the United States would face in the event 
of an FMD outbreak.  
2. Taiwan 
Taiwan was lulled into a false sense of security after being FMD-free for 
68 years. The levels of preparedness in Taiwan probably would have easily 
contained an outbreak of FMD, but increases in farm and animal density and 
reliance on pork products superseded the preplanned responses implemented by 
Taiwan.127 Taiwan attributes four factors to the extent of their outbreak:128 
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1. Delays in shutting down livestock markets 
2. Backlog of farms waiting for animals to be culled 
3. Shortage of vaccines during the emergency 
4. High density of pig farms 
Taiwan’s enormous reliance on pork prompted farmers to resist shutting 
down markets that acted as a cesspool of FMD and spread the virus throughout 
the country. A total shutdown of the market took five days to enforce, and by that 
time the damage was irreversible.129 The ability to enact immediate restrictions 
that stop all animal movements is a key in minimizing the spread of FMD. The 
backlog of farms with animals waiting to be culled served as a source of 
transmission to other farms. 
It was not until the military was involved that the backlog was eliminated. 
The importance of seeking outside help early to prevent backlogs will decrease 
the vulnerability of other farms to FMD. As a result, planning for military 
involvement in responses to outbreaks is another key take-away in the event of a 
biological outbreak. 
A shortage in vaccines is, in many regards, the same as being unable to 
cull livestock on a farm. Only vaccinating part of a herd leaves the other animals 
susceptible to contracting and subsequently spreading the disease. There needs 
to be enough vaccines to provide a vaccination blanket early in the outbreak.130 
An increase in the number of initial vaccines would also alleviate some of the 
personnel costs, because the need to quickly kill livestock would be reduced. 
The geographical constraints on the island of Taiwan concentrate 
83 percent the pig population to the southwest. Having almost 2000 pigs per km2 
in conjunction with the high concentration of aerosolized FMD made containing 
the spread of FMD virtually impossible. This factor is the hardest to mitigate, 
because of geographical limits. However, it places more importance on 
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perfecting the response in more controllable methods, because many farming 
communities around the world are in close proximity and rely on one another for 
support. 
The United States has much to learn from these case studies and 
applying them synchronously with feedback from exercises that take place every 
year will help build a response capable of minimizing losses in an FMD outbreak. 
In addition the United States can apply them to its Foot-and-Mouth-Disease 
Response Plan: The Red Book 2014 put together by the USDA, APHIS, National 
Center for Animal Health Emergency Management, and Foreign Animal Disease 
Preparedness & Response Plan (FAD PReP). The following chapter will explore 
the weaknesses of an outbreak of FMD in the United States and attempt to 
identify problems in the response plan in order to give policy recommendations 
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III. MEASURES THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE TO 
MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF AN FMD OUTBREAK 
The United States has been FMD-free since 1929, and a report from 1930 
shows that the importance of an early response is still important today when it 
said: 
So highly infectious is this foreign malady that prompt and drastic 
eradication measures are necessary to prevent its rapid spread, 
with resulting heavy losses to agriculture and industry.131 
Many issues plagued the U.K. and Taiwan responses to their FMD 
outbreaks. The lessons learned from these two case studies can guide the 
United States as it develops policies that government and private organizations 
can follow to minimize a potential FMD outbreak. However, the lessons learned 
must take into account the differences in agriculture, between the U.K., Taiwan, 
and the United States. For example, the United States is much larger than both 
of these countries and would require many more resources to respond to an 
outbreak. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture is responsible for developing a 
response plan that accounts for lessons learned and meets the goals of the 
organization in an outbreak. The USDA has three goals when responding to a 
foot and mouth disease outbreak in the United States: 
1. Detect, control, and contain FMD in animals as quickly as possible 
2. Eradicate FMD using strategies that seek to stabilize animal 
agriculture, the food supply, and the economy, and protect public 
health and the environment. 
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3. Provide science-and risk based approaches and systems to 
facilitate continuity of business for non-infected animals and non-
contaminated animal products.132 
If federal, state, and local responders accomplish these goals, the time to 
return to previous operations in the United States could be significantly 
reduced.133 This chapter will explore the ways the United States can accomplish 
these stated goals while taking into account lessons learned from the U.K. and 
Taiwan. 
A. RESPONSIBILITY 
The case studies show that, in order to properly develop a response to 
FMD, everyone potentially involved must know in which role and capacity they 
can serve. In the United States, this starts at the federal level and permeates to 
state, local, and tribal responders. 
1. Federal Responsibilities 
The federal government is responsible for developing laws and policies to 
guide a national-level crisis response. In order to accomplish the aforementioned 
goals, the United States has developed policies that dictate the strategies each 
agency must follow in the event of an FMD outbreak. Responding to a multistate 
pandemic with travel restrictions is complicated and must include all participating 
agencies. The involvement of all agencies can increase coordination during a 
multiagency response. The National Response Framework (NRF), National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), and the National Animal Health 
Emergency Management System must collectively agree on the preparedness 
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and response in order to develop a successful strategy.134 The United States 
Department of Agriculture uses policy guidance to plan state and federal 
responses to agricultural disasters. The statutes developed to guide the USDA 
are: the Animal Health Protection Act, Animal Welfare Act, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8, HSPD-9, 
HSPD-12, PPD-21, Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the Stafford Act.135 The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is in charge of implementing 
this plan, and it would designate the USDA as the lead agency in an FMD 
outbreak.136 The USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is 
the authority on animal disease control and would liaise with state, tribal, and 
local authorities on everything related to an FMD outbreak.137 These regulations 
guided the USDA as they developed the FMD Response Plan: The Red Book. 
The federal government also has access to supplemental resources in the 
National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps (NAHERC) and the National 
Guard. In both the U.K. and Taiwan cases, the military proved invaluable in 
supplementing manpower to clear backlogs and allowing veterinarians to develop 
treatment plans for infected farms. The development of NAHERC provides an 
avenue for veterinarians to gain knowledge of foreign animal diseases and 
become familiar with the symptoms and treatment method during immersion 
tours in countries where these diseases are prevalent.138 In the event of an 
outbreak, the federal government must utilize these assets before responders 
are overwhelmed and fall behind in treating animals and farms. 
                                            
134 USDA, Overview of the FMD Response Plan: The Red Book, 27. 




136 GAO, Foot and Mouth Disease, 54. 
137 USDA, Overview of the FMD Response Plan: The Red Book, 32. 
138 USDA, APHIS, “Animal Health Emergency Management.” 
 38
2. State and Local Responsibilities 
The National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) 
recommends that states develop plans to respond to animal health 
emergencies.139 The plans should include the following:  
1. Animal health surveillance and detection systems 
2. Control and eradication procedures 
3. Communication between key partners 
4. Involvement of emergency management officials 
5. Collaboration between state and federal emergency responders 
6. Involvement of state and federal animal health officials in 
responding to natural disasters140 
States should also participate in periodic tabletop exercises to develop 
and practice communication routines and simulate resource allocation. Ideally, 
they would disseminate the results of these exercises to stakeholders for 
evaluation and ways to improvement. 
One of the most important roles held by local farmers and veterinarians is 
their ability to identify the symptoms of FMD. These skills are critical to 
implementing a response in a timely manner. Specifically, it is the veterinarian’s 
responsibility to distinguish between FMD and other diseases that present the 
same symptoms, but are not nearly as devastating. The importance of farmers 
and veterinarians cannot be overstated, because their actions play a large part in 
determining the extent of an outbreak. 
B. RESPONSE 
Before any level of response can be initiated, there must first be a 
suspicion of FMD in livestock. Early and accurate detection is required in order to 
implement the FMD response plan. Unfortunately, on site testing for FMD has not 
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been developed. The ability to diagnose FMD at the local level would increase a 
community’s resilience to an FMD outbreak. While advances are being made in 
determining the presence of FMD in laboratories, the development of technology 
that can diagnose FMD immediately would improve response time and possibly 
minimize the extent of an outbreak. In the U.K., a positive diagnosis was not 
determined until the head of veterinary medicine personally visited the infected 
farm. This precedent is a waste of resources and displays a lack of trust in 
individuals trained to fight this type of outbreak. A flow chart that is followed to 
determine whether or not there is a presence of FMD is shown in Figure 3. 
Currently, all testing for FMD in the United States is done at National 
Veterinary Services Laboratories—Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic 
Laboratory (NVSL FADDL) at Plum Island, New York. The laboratory can usually 
deliver a positive or negative determination in less than 24 hours, but isolating 
the serotype to determine the vaccine specific to an FMD strain can take 
approximately one week.141 Identification of serotypes is used to determine the 
type of vaccination that treats the type of FMD identified. This is a step that, if 
reduced, could potentially reduce the reach of FMD. 
The United States realizes this ageing facility is approaching the end of its 
service life and has already identified a replacement site in Manhattan, Kansas. 
The new laboratory site in Kansas will be a state of the art facility that will lead 
the way in research of foreign animal diseases. This facility will allow the United 
States to research highly contagious diseases and not only develop but produce 
its own vaccines when responding to outbreaks of FMD and other harmful 
pathogens. When the United States produces vaccinations, their reliance on 
other countries drops significantly. This critical capability can reduce response 
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times and ensure the quality of the vaccines being sent to U.S. farmers.142 
Another key aspect of this facility will be its ability to train veterinarians and other 
responders in proper responses against threats like FMD.143 Federal officials 
broke ground in Manhattan, Kansas on May 27, 2015, and the $1.25 billion 
facility is expected to take over the mission Plum Island currently fills in 2023.144 
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Figure 3.  Diagnostic Flowchart for Initial Investigation of FMD145 
                                            
145 USDA, Overview of FMD Diagnostics, 1. 
 42
1. Communications 
The U.K. and Taiwan case studies highlight the importance of 
communication in an FMD response plan. In the U.K. a sample, which eventually 
tested positive for FMD, from the first suspicious animal was not tested for twelve 
hours, because an email was never sent alerting the technicians of its arrival. 
This lack of communication resulted in valuable time lost that could have been 
used to initiate controlling measures. The presence of flowcharts and timelines 
are great, but only when properly utilized by responders. It is essential that 
responders of all types communicate efficiently and effectively to each other and 
that consumers are provided with quality, up-to-date information.146 
FMD response teams conduct periodic table top exercises that create or 
reinforce lines of communication. These exercises update responders as new 
people enter positions, or as agencies change tactics to conform to new 
guidelines. The responders, through exercises, ensure everyone is taking actions 
based on the same material. The potential to advance the spread of FMD is 
increased if some responders are referencing information from an outdated 
source. Responders should have regular discussions with industry leaders like 
the USDA and local veterinarians to convey the restrictions on travel and scope 
of the problem.147 
Another important aspect of communication is delivering information to 
consumers. Public awareness can be delivered through the evening news, 
newspapers, and technology-based avenues. A study from the FMD Cross-
Species communications team determined that people think they have heard of 
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FMD, people want more details, and people want reassurance during an 
outbreak.148 
The necessity to inform consumers about FMD during an outbreak is 
important because most people confuse FMD with Hand, Foot and Mouth 
disease (a disease that affects humans) when FMD does not affect the human 
body. The study also found that consumers want to be made aware of the 
relevant FMD response events. Consumers are impacted from movement 
restrictions to carcass disposal, not to mention, whether or not they will still have 
their job in the agriculture industry. Effective and honest communication to 
consumers can alleviate the sense of public insecurity that often accompanies 
major disaster.149 
The study also found that there are methods of communication that work 
and methods that do not. It determined that consumers were receptive to 
messages that stated the relevance of the FMD outbreak, were safety conscious, 
presented information at a consumer’s level of understanding, were credible, 
provided more resources, and explained the impact.150 The types of messages 
that failed to inspire confidence were messages with outdated resources, 
messages with no research to support claims, messages that raised more 
questions than answers, and messages with ambiguous ways to get more 
information.151 
2. Early Assistance 
In both the U.K. and Taiwan case studies, the response teams quickly 
developed backlogs of farms and animals to be tested and destroyed. It was not 
until supplemental personnel, in the form of military and conscripted 
veterinarians, were called to help an undermanned response team that the 
                                            





backlogs developed were reduced or removed. The U.S. livestock industry is 
expansive, and responders can quickly become exhausted, if an outbreak 
spreads too far. The USDA, in the event of an outbreak, has the ability to ask the 
federal government to supplement response efforts with the National Guard. This 
is particularly convenient because each state has its own component. In addition 
to the National Guard, NAHERC can activate and provide trained veterinarians to 
assist in the diagnosis and treatment of animal herds.152 Ideally, the veterinarians 
of NAHERC will have experience in FMD from their time serving in countries 
where the disease is prevalent. 
3. Adopting a Response Strategy 
There are seven traditional response strategies to FMD, and Figure 4 
explains a strategy, how likely it is to be used, and an example of application for 
each response strategy. The United States identifies five of those seven as 
possible methods for eradicating FMD. Those methods are: stamping-out (no 
emergency vaccine), stamping-out modified with emergency vaccinate-to-kill, 
stamping-out modified with emergency vaccinate-to-slaughter, stamping-out 
modified with emergency vaccinate-to-live, and vaccinate-to-live (without 
stamping-out).153 Each of these strategies depends on a number of different 
criteria and some are more socially, politically, and medically accepted than 
others. For example, a stamping-out method will require the killing of all animals 
even if the animals appear healthy and may not contract the disease. This would 
more than likely spark protest and discontent in some subcultures throughout the 
United States.154 The factors that determine the decision-making process are 
presented in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Factors Influencing the Decision to Use Emergency 
Vaccination Strategies156 
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There are many important considerations to be made when determining a 
response strategy and no individual factor will determine the strategy chosen.157 
The decision will be based on all known information, because region, serotype, 
species affected, and size of outbreak all have roles in a strategic decision—with 
the final decision resting on the USDA. In order for the United States to minimize 
the effects of FMD, the chosen strategy must be decided on early. 
After observing Figures 4 and 5, one can appreciate the complexity of 
developing a response strategy for an outbreak, but one can also see the 
potential for confusion as the outbreak becomes more widespread. The 
framework of these strategies provides a fluid response mechanism that can 
adapt to the changing environment of an FMD outbreak. However, having so 
many different courses of action can convolute the communication spectrum and 
lead to different regions applying different strategies. This potential problem 
emphasizes the requirement of clear and concise communication practices.  
Vaccines play a key role in determining a response plan, and there are a 
couple key factors to consider when adopting a response plan, where vaccines 
play a critical role. Because the United States has been FMD since 1929, the 
contagious disease is restricted from laboratories on the United States 
mainland.158 The only laboratory that allows scientists to study FMD is located on 
Plum Island, NY. The decision to use this island was to provide a buffer zone, in 
hopes of preventing the spread of dangerous pathogens stored there, if there 
was ever an emergency at the facility. Ideally, this facility would provide all 
vaccinations for the United States in the event of an outbreak, but Plum Island 
does not have the capacity to manufacture the amount of vaccine needed to 
respond to an FMD outbreak in the United States.  
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Because of this, it the FMD serotype is identified by Plum Island, the 
United States would need to have the vaccine produced overseas.159 In a crisis, 
the United States should not rely on other countries to develop FMD vaccines. 
The United States is developing the capability to manufacture the amount and 
type of vaccines needed in an outbreak, but the facility will not be operational 
until 2023.160 
4. Zoning of FMD 
In order to minimize the spread of FMD, zones are placed around the 
origin of the disease outbreak; they increase in size as the disease spreads. The 
outbreak areas are broken in two or three zones, as dictated by the USDA, and 
determine the actions responders take in each. The area immediately 
surrounding the infected premises is labeled the infected zone (IZ) and it extends 
at least three kilometers (km) beyond the perimeters of the infected premises. 
The area surrounding the IZ is called the buffer zone (BZ). This zone extends 
7 km beyond the perimeter of the IZ, and it is intended to provide an area large 
enough to allow responders to vaccinate animals and prevent the spread of FMD 
outside the control area (CA).161 The U.K. and Taiwan failed to implement 
movement restrictions in and out of these areas, allowing animal transport that 
undermined the purpose of these zones. State and local officials will be key in 
preventing a breach in the integrity of zone enforcement. 
5. Economic Impact 
The economic effects of FMD are determined by the size of the outbreak. 
Once an outbreak of FMD is detected, the number of animals that will be infected 
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depends on the effectiveness of the controls implemented.162 In a regional 
analysis scenario, centered in Kansas, where five large farms were infected  
with FMD there would be over 1.68 million head of cattle culled over a duration  
of 89 days.163 The massive loss of animals would have a huge impact on  
the livestock industry and create a loss in consumer confidence. The impact of 
FMD on five large farms in Kansas would have an impact of approximately 
$12.7 billion of total losses.164 The GAO reports that an outbreak in the United 
States, comparable to Taiwan’s 1997 outbreak, could total $24 billion in just 
controlling and eradiation costs—not including the losses in trade and decreased 
domestic consumer confidence.165 
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A. LIVESTOCK AND FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE 
This thesis has shown that introducing FMD into the United States could 
have a devastating effect on the agriculture industry, specifically, the high 
concentration areas of the livestock industry. The United States has established 
and reinforced governing policies, a lead organization, a response plan, and 
training opportunities for veterinarians and responding agencies to follow during 
an FMD outbreak. All of these measures are significant steps toward increasing 
resilience and sustainability of the U.S. livestock industry. 
Chapter I described the critical infrastructure of agriculture in the United 
States. It systematically explained the different levels of agriculture while 
developing a basal knowledge of livestock farming practices. In addition, it 
described the interconnectedness of the livestock industry and the inherent 
vulnerabilities high concentration farming practices have to dangerous biological 
pathogens, like FMD. Chapter one also described the economic value of the 
livestock industry and its significant contribution to U.S. GDP. 
Chapter II dissected two case studies, U.K. 2001 and Taiwan 1997, 
wherein FMD was introduced and devastated livestock industries that had been 
FMD-free for decades. These case studies provided lessons learned that allowed 
the author to compare, in Chapter III, the United States implementation of 
lessons learned in its response plan. Chapter III provided a look at the United 
States approach in responding to an FMD outbreak and the measures that can 
still be implemented to minimize the effects of FMD. The chapter started by 
describing the responsibilities of the federal government, state government, and 
responders to an outbreak. It also walked through different decisions that must 
be made during an outbreak, demonstrating the need for clear communication. 
This thesis confirmed that there are significant economic, social, and 
psychological consequences to an FMD outbreak, as seen in the case studies 
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from the U.K. and Taiwan. There are measures the United States can take to 
reduce its vulnerability to this type of outbreak. The United State has addressed 
many of the issues that overwhelmed responders in the U.K. and Taiwan. 
However, there are ways that the U.S. response can be optimized. 
1. Ensure the FMD response plan is disseminated to all veterinary 
offices and understood by key players: veterinarians and first 
responders. 
2. Reduce the amount of time between farmer suspicion of FMD and 
diagnosis of FMD by developing testing methods at state veterinary 
labs to allow for immediate control measure to be taken. 
3. Develop a laboratory capable of testing and manufacturing 
vaccinations on the U.S. mainland to eliminate the requirement to 
involve other countries in our response efforts. 
4. Ask for help before responders are overwhelmed this will reduce 
the number of vulnerable node that can spread FMD. 
5. Have a clear picture of the operating environment when 
determining a response strategy to reduce the chance of a change 
in strategy. Get it right the first time. 
The United States is continuing to improve prevention and response 
measures every year, but the interconnectedness of U.S. agriculture to the rest 
of the world and high-concentration farming practices could allow a biological 
pathogen to be introduced. The cost of a negligent approach to this threat is too 
high, because it is just a matter time before the United States is faced with this 
type of outbreak. 
B. FUTURE WORK: IMPLICATIONS OF TERROR THREAT  
Farmers in the United States take great pride in running humane, clean, 
and profitable organizations. The threat of FMD being introduced in one of these 
herds is significantly reduced through these practices, by alleviating the need for 
vaccines. However, according to experts such as Jim Monke, Peter Chalk, and 
Richard Danzig, it is only a matter of time before a terrorist organization, foreign 
or domestic, exploits the lack of vaccines and uses the absence of vaccines 
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against farmers.166 Terrorist attacks are nothing new, and the terrorist attacks of 
September 11 showed that seemingly far-fetched schemes are plausible and 
things once thought to be safe are potentially at risk. 
This thesis has demonstrated that an outbreak of FMD is devastating even 
without an element of terrorist intent, and even though there has not been a 
successful large-scale terrorist attack on the agriculture industry, the danger is 
still there from natural causes. But the ability to eliminate all vulnerabilities in the 
livestock industry is very low, and a terrorist attack on the agricultural 
infrastructure of the United States could have lasting detrimental effects on the 
world economy. This strongly suggests more work should be done to assess the 
viability of terrorists targeting the livestock industry. 
  
                                            
166 Danzig, Policymaker’s Guide to Bioterrorism, 2; Monke, Agroterrorism: Threats and 
Preparedness, ii; Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly. 
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